Starlink in Iran: From a Communication Tool to a Component of Warfare
09 October 2026 WANA News
WANA (Oct 09) – Recent remarks by the head of Iran’s National Cyberspace Center about the country’s success in disabling Starlink have once again highlighted the role of the satellite internet network in Iran’s security and military developments; a network that in recent years has evolved from a tool for accessing the internet during communication blackouts into part of the dynamics of protests and war.
Mohammad-Amin Aghamiri, head of Iran’s National Cyberspace Center, said on October 5 that Iran had disabled Starlink during the January protests. Referring also to the thwarting of cyberattacks during the U.S. and Israeli attack, he said Iran has already developed the technologies needed to counter such threats and is technically prepared to confront potential threats.
However, Starlink’s significance in Iran extends beyond bypassing internet shutdowns. The way the technology entered the country, its use during protests and war, the number of Starlinks in the country, Iran’s efforts to counter it, and explicit U.S. and Israeli positions on the network have made Starlink part of the broader dispute over communications sovereignty and national security.
From Internet Access Without Domestic Infrastructure to a Tool of Protests
Starlink gradually entered Iran’s security environment following the 2022 protests. The network, despite its operation being prohibited in Iran, entered the country through unofficial channels and provided direct access to the global internet without relying on telecommunications towers and domestic infrastructure.
This capability became more significant during the January 2026 protests. Amid a widespread internet shutdown, some Iranian users continued to use Starlink, and the network became one of the few remaining channels for communication with the outside world.
Subsequently, reports emerged about the covert transfer of thousands of Starlinks to Iran. Some reports said around 6,000 devices had been transferred to Iran, while other reports also emerged about efforts by Israel to transfer a larger number of these devices.
Starlink’s political role became clearer later. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu held a Starlink during his speech at the United Nations General Assembly in September 2026 and said the device could enable Iranians to access information, choice, freedom of thought, and freedom of expression. After the speech, Israel’s ambassador to the United Nations also attempted to hand the same device to an Iranian diplomat.
Thus, the political use of Starlink is no longer merely an interpretation of the technology’s function; Israel’s top political official has openly presented it as a tool for communicating with Iranian society and bypassing communication restrictions, an action that, from Tehran’s perspective as well as in international communities, could also be examined within the framework of foreign influence and interference.
From Protests to the Battlefield
Recent wars have further increased Starlink’s importance. One day after Israel began its attacks on Iran during the 12-day war, Elon Musk announced that Starlink coverage had been activated over Iran.
During the 40-day war, the network’s role was not limited to civilian communications. According to reports, the U.S. military used Starlink communications in connection with LUCAS suicide drones, indicating that a commercial satellite network can also become part of communications and operational infrastructure on the battlefield.
Over just a few years, Starlink has evolved from a communications tool for ordinary users into a technology with operational significance during protests, internet shutdowns and wartime.
How Many Starlinks Are There in Iran?
There is no precise figure for the number of active Starlinks in Iran, and estimates vary because of the clandestine nature of the equipment’s entry into the country and the difficulty of identifying them.
Reports have put the number of devices at between 10,000 and 20,000 during the early stages of the 12-day war, around 50,000 at later stages, and even estimates of up to 100,000 in Iran. Some sources, instead of referring to the number of devices, have spoken of more than 100,000 users.
Starlink’s small, portable design has also made it difficult to identify all of them, a point mentioned in documents from the ITU’s Radio Regulations Board.
How Did Iran Disrupt Starlink?
During the January protests, technical reports emerged of significant disruption to Starlink communications. Some reports cited packet loss of around 30 to 80 percent and attributed the disruption to electronic warfare and jamming measures.
Aside from the possibility that Iran may have developed a domestic system for creating such interference, the name Kalinka has been mentioned in some media and technical reports. Kalinka is a Russian electronic warfare system designed to detect and counter satellite communications, and its capability to target communications systems such as Starlink has attracted attention.
Tobol is also a Russian electronic warfare system designed to counter satellite communications, and it has been mentioned in reports on Russia’s anti-satellite technologies. However, Iran’s confirmed use of these systems has not been officially verified to date.
At the same time, the possibility of transferring Russian knowledge or technology to Iran remains significant. Some analyses have even raised the possibility of broader cooperation between Iran, Russia and China in electronic warfare, signal detection and countering satellite constellations.
What Will Iran Do in the Next War?
Aghamiri said Iran has developed the technologies needed to counter threats and is prepared to confront them. These remarks, together with the experience of January, indicate that countering Starlink could become part of Iran’s electronic warfare and communications security strategy in a potential future conflict.
This approach could have several layers: identifying and locating Starlink devices, preventing the entry of new equipment, controlling and taking legal action against existing terminals, disrupting satellite communications, and using electronic warfare systems to counter signals.
Technical cooperation with Russia and, more broadly, China could also be one avenue for strengthening such capabilities, particularly given these countries’ competition with the United States in the fields of satellite constellations and electronic warfare.
Iran has not released details of a specific operational plan for a future war, but the experience of January has shown that countering Starlink will no longer be limited simply to shutting down the domestic internet.
Iranian Law: Starlink Is No Longer Just a Technical Issue
Alongside technical measures, Iran has also criminalized Starlink use. In June 2025, the Iranian Parliament banned the use, purchase, sale, import and provision of unlicensed internet communications equipment, including Starlink, and set penalties of six months to two years in prison and confiscation of the equipment. Supplying or importing more than 10 devices can also result in five to 10 years in prison, while harsher penalties may apply under wartime or security conditions.
The law indicates that Tehran does not view Starlink merely as a tool for bypassing internet restrictions, but rather as part of the issue of communications security and the unauthorized entry and use of communications equipment.
Starlink and the Boundaries of Foreign Intervention Under International Law
Under international law, the central issue in this debate is not Starlink technology itself, but the use of a communications tool by a state, or with its support, to exert coercive influence over developments inside another country.
The principle of non-intervention in the internal affairs of states is a recognized rule of customary international law. The 1970 UN General Assembly Declaration on Friendly Relations states that no state has the right to intervene, directly or indirectly, in the internal or external affairs of another state and that states should not organize, assist, finance or incite subversive, armed or similar activities against another state.
Therefore, the legal issue surrounding Starlink in Iran is not simply whether people have the right to use satellite internet. The more important question is whether, if a foreign government knowingly uses a communications infrastructure to organize, coordinate or strengthen a political and destabilizing movement in another country, such action could constitute unlawful intervention.
Iran’s case at the ITU also has a distinct but complementary legal dimension. The organization’s Radio Regulations Board has stated that the provision of Starlink services from within Iranian territory, where authorization has not been granted, is inconsistent with the international Radio Regulations and has asked Norway and the United States to take action to stop such transmissions.
Ultimately, Starlink in Iran is no longer merely an internet service; it has become a point of convergence between communications technology, protests, electronic warfare, military operations, domestic law, international telecommunications regulations, and the dispute over the limits of foreign intervention.
By Z.Agharezaei
WANA News Agency
